Title

  Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.1.3.8: Sending Liveness check with unprotected messages
  Part A: (BASIC)

Purpose

  To verify an IKEv2 device handles cryptographically unprotected Messages.

References

  * [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.4

Test Setup

  * Network Topology
      Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
  * Configuration
      In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
      Configure the timer to consider that the peer is dead to 30 seconds.
  * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
      IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.

Procedure

   NUT                  TN1
(End-Node)           (End-Node)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
    |                    | (Judgement #1)
    |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
    |                    | (Packet #1)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #2)
    |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #2)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| Echo Request
    |                    | (Packet #3)
    |----------X         | Echo Reply 
    |                    | (Judgement #3)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {})
    |                    | (Judgement #4)
    |                    |
    V                    V

 N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE

Packet #1	See Common Packet #2
Packet #2	See Common Packet #4
Packet #3	See below

Packet #3: Echo Request

IPv6 Header	Source Address	TN1's Global Address
	Destination Address	NUT's Global Address
	Type	128
	Code	0
	Identifier	0
	Sequence Number	any
	Payload Data	0x0000000000000000

  Part A: (BASIC)
       1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
       2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
       3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
       4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
       5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
          response to the NUT
       6. TN1 trasmits a cryptographically unprotected Echo Request to the NUT.
       7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.

Observable Result

  Part A
    Step 2: Judgment #1
      The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT response including "ENCR_3DES",
      "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as accepted
      algorithms.

    Step 4: Judgment #2
      The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH response including "ENCR_3DES",
      "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as accepted algorithms.

    Step 7: Judgment #3
      The NUT never responds with a cryptographically unprotected Echo Reply. The NUT
      transmits an INFORMATIONAL request followed by an Encrypted payload with no payloads
      contained in it.

Possible Problems

  * NUT may have the different trigger other than timer to send an INFORMATIONAL
    request for the liveness check. In that case, TN must be adjusted to support such a
    trigger.