Title

  Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.1.4.2: Unrecognized payload types and Critical bit is set
  Part A: Invalid payload type 1 and Critical bit is set (BASIC)

Purpose

  To verify an IKEv2 device rejects the messages with invalid payload types when the invalid
  type payload's critical bit is set.

References

  * [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.5

Test Setup

  * Network Topology
      Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
  * Configuration
      In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
  * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
      IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.

Procedure

   NUT                  TN1
(End-Node)           (End-Node)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
    |                    | (Judgement #1)
    |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
    |                    | (Packet #1)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N+, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #2)
    |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N+, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #2)
    |                    |
   ---                  ---
    |                    |                        ---
    |<-------------------| IPSec {Echo Request}    |
    |                    | (Packet #3)             |
    |------------------->| IPSec {Echo Reply}      | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
    |                    | (Judgement #3)          |
    |                    |                        ---
   ---                  ---
    |                    |
    |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #4)
    |<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SK {P, N+, SA, Nr, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #4)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| IPSec {Echo Request} (new CHILD_SA)
    |                    | (Packet #5)
    |----------X         | IPSec {Echo Reply} (new CHILD_SA)
    |                    | (Judgement #5)
    |                    |
    V                    V P: Payload with an invalid payload type
 N: REKEY_SA
 N+: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE

Packet #1	See Common Packet #2
Packet #2	See Common Packet #4
Packet #3	See Common Packet #19
Packet #4	See below
Packet #5	See Common Packet #19

Packet #4: CREATE_CHILD_SA response

IPv6 Header	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload
UDP Header	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload
IKEv2 Header	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload
E Payload	Next Payload	Invalid payload type value
	Other fields are same as Common Packet #14
Invalid Payload	Next Payload	41(N)
	Critical	1
	Reserved	0
	Payload Length	4
N Payload	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload
SA Payload	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload
Ni, Nr paylaod	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload
TSi Payload	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload
TSr Payload	All fields are same as Common Packet #14 Payload

  Part A: Invalid payload type 1 and Critical bit is set (BASIC)
     1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
     2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
     4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
          response to the NUT
     6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the first negotiated algorithms to NUT.
     7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
     9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
    10. After reception of CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying from the NUT, TN1 responds
        with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response which includes a payload with invalid payload type
        to the NUT. The E payload's IKE Header Next Payload field is set to 1 and the invalid
        payload's critical flag is set.
    11. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
    12. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the second negotiated algorithms to
         NUT.
    13. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.

Observable Result

  Part A
       Step 2: Judgment #1
       The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
       lgorithms.

       Step 4: Judgment #2
       The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.

       Step 7: Judgment #3
       The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.

       Step 11: Judgment #4
       The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed
       algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request includes a Notify payload of type
       REKEY_SA containing rekeyed CHILD_SA's SPI value in the SPI field.

       Step 13: Judgment #5
       The NUT never transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using the second negotiated
       algorithms.

Possible Problems

  * None.