Title

  Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.1.6.10: Response with inconsistent proposal for CHILD_SA
  Part A: (BASIC)

Purpose

  To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles a response with a SA payload which is
  inconsistent with one of its proposals.

References

  * [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.7 and 3.3

Test Setup

  * Network Topology
      Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
  * Configuration
      In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
  * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
      IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.

Procedure

   NUT                  TN1
(End-Node)           (End-Node)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
    |                    | (Judgement #1)
    |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
    |                    | (Packet #1)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #2)
    |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #2)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| IPSec {Echo Request}
    |                    | (Packet #3)
    |----------X         | IPSec {Echo Reply}
    |                    | (Judgement #3)
    |                    |
    V                    V
  
 N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE

Packet #1	See Common Packet #2
Packet #2	See below
Packet #3	See Common Packet #19

Packet #1: IKE_SA_INIT response

IPv6 Header	Same as the Common Packet #4
UDP Header	Same as the Common Packet #4
IKEv2 Header	Same as the Common Packet #4
E Payload	Same as the Common Packet #4
IDr Payload	Same as the Common Packet #4
AUTH Payload	Same as the Common Packet #4
N Payload	Same as the Common Packet #4
SA Payload	See below
TSi Payload	Same as the Common Packet #4
TSr Payload	Same as the Common Packet #4

SA Payload	Next Payload				44 (TSi)
	Critical				0
	Reserved				0
	Payload Length				44
	Proposal #1	SA Proposal	Next Payload		0 (last)
			Reserved		0
			Proposal Length		40
			Proposal #		1
			Protocol ID		3 (ESP)
			SPI Size		4
			# of Transforms		3
			SA Transform	See below
			SA Transform	Next Payload	3 (more)
				Reserved	0
				Transform Length	8
				Transform Type	3 (INTEG)
				Reserved	0
				Transform ID	2 (HMAC_SHA1_96)
			SA Transform	Next Payload	0 (last)
				Reserved	0
				Transform Length	8
				Transform Type	5 (Extended Sequence Number)
				Reserved	0
				Transform ID	0 (No Extended Sequence Number)

SA Transform	Next Payload		3 (more)
	Reserved		0
	Transform Length		12
	Transform Type		1 (ENCR)
	Reserved		0
	Transform ID		12 (AES_CBC)
	SA Attribute	Attribute Type	14 (Key Length)
		Attribute Value	128

  Part A: (BASIC)
     1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
     2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
     4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     5. TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH response to the NUT. But the response includes a SA
         payload which has a different Transform ID from the proposed one.
     6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using ENCR_AES_CBC and
         AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96.
     7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.

Observable Result

  Part A
       Step 2: Judgment #1
       The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_AES_CBC",
       "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
       algorithms.

       Step 4: Judgment #2
       The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.

       Step 7: Judgment #3
       The NUT never transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using ENCR_AES_CBC and
       AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96.

Possible Problems

  * Step 7
    The NUT may transmit or retransmit an IKE_AUTH request. And the NUT may notify
    INVALID_SPI.