Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.1.6.9: Response with inconsistent SA proposal for IKE_SA Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles a response with a SA payload which is inconsistent with one of its proposals.
* [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.7 and 3.3
* Network Topology Connect the devices according to the Common Topology. * Configuration In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration. * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1 (End-Node) (End-Node) | | |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni) | | (Judgement #1) |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr) | | (Packet #1) | | |---------X | IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr}) | | (Judgement #2) | | V V N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
Packet #1 See below
Packet #1: IKE_SA_INIT response
IPv6 Header Same as the Common Packet #2 UDP Header Same as the Common Packet #2 IKEv2 Header Same as the Common Packet #2 SA Payload See below KEi Payload Same as the Common Packet #2 Ni Payload Same as the Common Packet #2
SA Payload Next Payload 34 (KE) Critical 0 Reserved 0 Payload Length 44 Proposal #1 SA Proposal Next Payload 0 (last) Reserved 0 Proposal Length 40 Proposal # 1 Protocol ID 1 (IKE) SPI Size 0 # of Transforms 4 SA Transform See below SA Transform Next Payload 3 (more) Reserved 0 Transform Length 8 Transform Type 2 (PRF) Reserved 0 Transform ID 2 (HMAC_SHA1) SA Transform Next Payload 3 (more) Reserved 0 Transform Length 8 Transform Type 3 (INTEG) Reserved 0 Transform ID 2 (HMAC_SHA1_96) SA Transform Next Payload 0 (last) Reserved 0 Transform Length 8 Transform Type 4 (D-H) Reserved 0 Transform ID 2 (1024 MODP Group)
SA Transform Next Payload 3 (more) Reserved 0 Transform Length 12 Transform Type 1 (ENCR) Reserved 0 Transform ID 12 (AES_CBC) SA Attribute Attribute Type 14 (Key Length) Attribute Value 128
Part A: (BASIC) 1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request. 2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A. 3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT. But the response includes a SA payload which has a different Transform ID from the proposed one. 4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A Step 2: Judgment #1 The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_AES_CBC", "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2 The NUT never transmits an IKE_AUTH request.
* Step 4 The NUT may transmit or retransmit an IKE_SA_INIT request.