Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.3.2: Use of the new CHILD_SA
Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly rekeys CHILD_SA
* [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.8
* Network Topology
Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
* Configuration
In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 300 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 30
seconds.
* Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1
(End-Node) (End-Node)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
| | (Judgement #1)
|<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
| | (Packet #1)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N+, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #2)
|<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N+, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #2)
| |
--- ---
| | ---
|<-------------------| IPSec {Echo Request} |
| | (Packet #3) |
|------------------->| IPSec {Echo Reply} | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
| | (Judgement #3) |
| | ---
--- ---
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #4)
|<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SK {N+, SA, Nr, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #4)
| |
|------------------->| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Judgement #5)
|<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL Response (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Packet #5)
| |
|<-------------------| IPSec {Echo Request}
| | (Packet #6)
|------------------->| IPSec {Echo Reply}
| | (Judgement #6)
| |
V V
N: REKEY_SA
N+: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
| Packet #1 |
See Common Packet #2 |
| Packet #2 |
See Common Packet #4 |
| Packet #3 |
See Common Packet #19 |
| Packet #4 |
See Common Packet #14 |
| Packet #5 |
See below |
| Packet #6 |
See Common Packet #19
This packet is cryptographically protected by
the new CHILD_SA negotiated at Step 10. |
* Packet #5: INFORMATIONAL response
| IPv6 Header |
Source Address |
TN1's Global Address on Link X |
| Destination Address |
NUT's Global Address on Link A |
| UDP Header |
Source Port |
500 |
| Destination Port |
500 |
| IKEv2 Header |
IKE_SA Initiator's SPI |
any |
| IKE_SA Responder's SPI |
any |
| Next Payload |
46 (E) |
| Major Version |
2 |
| Minor Version |
0 |
| Exchange Type |
37 (INFORMATIONAL) |
| X (bits 0-2 of Flags) |
0 |
| I (bit 3 of Flags) |
any |
| V (bit 4 of Flags) |
0 |
| R (bit 5 of Flags) |
1 |
| X (bits 6-7 Flags) |
0 |
| Message ID |
0 |
| Length |
any |
| E Payload |
Next Payload |
42 (D) |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
any |
| Initialization Vector |
The same value as block length of the underlying encryption algorithm |
Encrypted IKE Payloads |
Subsequent payloads encrypted by underlying encryption algorithm |
| Padding |
Any value which to be a multiple of the encryption block size |
| Pad Length |
The length of the Padding field |
| Integrity Checksum Data |
The Cryptographic checksum of the entire message |
| D Payload |
Next Payload |
0 |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
12 |
| Protocol ID |
3 (ESP) |
| SPI Size |
4 |
| # of SPIs |
1 |
| Security Parameter Index |
NUT's inbound CHILD_SA SPI value to be deleted |
Part A: (BASIC)
1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
response to the NUT
6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the first negotiated algorithms to NUT.
7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
10. After reception of CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying from the NUT, TN1 responds
with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response to the NUT.
11. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
12. TN1 responds with an INFORMATIONAL response with a Delete payload to the NUT.
13. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the second negotiated algorithms to
the NUT.
14. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A
Step 2: Judgment #1
The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2
The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 7: Judgment #3
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
Step 9: Judgment #4
The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed
algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request includes a Notify payload of type
REKEY_SA containing rekeyed CHILD_SA's SPI value in the SPI field.
Step 11: Judgment #5
The NUT transmits an INFORMATIONAL request with a Delete payload. The Delete
payload includes 3 (ESP) as Protocol ID, 4 as SPI Size and the inblund SPI value to be
deleted as SPI.
Step 14: Judgment #6
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using the second negotiated algorithms.
* Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.