Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.3.6: Rekying Failure
Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles rekeying failure.
* [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.8
* Network Topology
Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
* Configuration
In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 300 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 30
seconds.
* Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1
(End-Node) (End-Node)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
| | (Judgement #1)
|<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
| | (Packet #1)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #2)
|<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #2)
| |
--- ---
| | ---
|<-------------------| IPSec {Echo Request} |
| | (Packet #3) |
|------------------->| IPSec {Echo Reply} | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
| | (Judgement #3) |
| | ---
--- ---
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni))
| | (Judgement #4)
|<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr))
| | (Packet #4)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
| | (Judgement #5)
|<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
| | (Packet #5)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N+, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #6)
| |
V V
N: REKEY_SA
N+: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
| Packet #1 |
See Common Packet #2 |
| Packet #2 |
See Common Packet #4 |
| Packet #3 |
See Common Packet #19 |
| Packet #4 |
See Common Packet #14 |
| Packet #5 |
See Common Packet #2 |
Part A: (BASIC)
1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
response to the NUT
6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the first negotiated algorithms to NUT.
7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
10. After reception of CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying from the NUT, TN1 reject
the NUT's proposal and responds with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response with a Notify of
type NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN.
11. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
12. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
13. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A
Step 2: Judgment #1
The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2
The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 7: Judgment #3
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
Step 9: Judgment #4
The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed
algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request includes a Notify payload of type
REKEY_SA containing rekeyed CHILD_SA's SPI value in the SPI field.
Step 11: Judgment #5
The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
algorithms.
Step 13: Judgment #6
The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
* Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.