Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.4.7: Changing PRFs when rekeying the IKE_SA
Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles CREATE_CHILD_SA to rekey IKE_SA.
* [RFC 4306] - Sections 2.8
* [RFC 4718] - Sections 5.5
* Network Topology
Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
* Configuration
In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 60 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 300
seconds.
Configure the devices according to the Common Configuration except for Italic
parameters.
|
IKE_SA Rekeying Algorithms |
| Encryption |
PRF |
Integrity |
D-H Group |
| Part A |
ENCR_3DES |
PRF_HMAC_SHA1 |
AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96 |
Group 14 |
* Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1
(End-Node) (End-Node)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
| | (Judgement #1)
|<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
| | (Packet #1)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #2)
|<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #2)
| |
--- ---
| | ---
|<-------------------| IPSec {Echo Request} |
| | (Packet #3) |
|------------------->| IPSec {Echo Reply} | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
| | (Judgement #3) |
| | ---
--- ---
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {SA, Ni})
| | (Judgement #4)
|<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SK {SA, Nr})
| | (Packet #4)
| |
|------------------->| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Judgement #5)
|<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {})
| | (Packet #5)
| |
|<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {})
| | (Judgement #6)
|------------------->| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {})
| | (Packet #6)
| |
V V
N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
| Packet #1 |
See Common Packet #2 |
| Packet #2 |
See Common Packet #4 |
| Packet #3 |
See Common Packet #19 |
| Packet #4 |
See below |
| Packet #5 |
See Common Packet #18 |
| Packet #6 |
See Common Packet #17 |
Packet #4: CREATE_CHILD_SA response
Packet #4 is same as Common Packet #12 except SA Transform proposed in each test.
Part A:
SA Transform of Tranform Type D-H is replaced by the following SA Transform.
| SA Transform |
Next Payload |
0 (last) |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Transform Length |
8 |
| Transform Type |
4 (D-H) |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Transform ID |
14 (2048 MODP Group) |
Part A: (BASIC)
1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
response to the NUT
6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms to NUT.
7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
10. After reception of CREATE_CHILD_SA request for rekeying from the NUT, TN1 responds
with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response to the NUT.
11. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
12. TN1 responds with an INFORMATIONAL response to an INFORMATIONAL request to
close the replaced IKE_SA.
13. TN1 transmits an INFORMATIONAL request with no payloads cryptographically protected
by new IKE_SA.
14. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A
Step 2: Judgment #1
The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2
The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 7: Judgment #3
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
Step 9: Judgment #4
The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 14" as proposed
algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request includes 1 (IKE) in the Protocol ID field,
8 in the SPI size field and rekeyed IKE_SA's SPI value in the SPI field.
Step 11: Judgment #5
The NUT transmits an INFORMATIONAL request with a Delete payload to close the
replaced IKE_SA.
Step 14: Judgment #6
The NUT resopndes with an INFORMATIONAL response with not payloads
cryptographically protected by new IKE_SA.
* Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.