Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.6.14: Closing an IKE_SA while rekeying an IKE_SA
Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles a request to close an IKE_SA after IKE_SA
rekey has been started.
* [RFC 4718] - Sections 5.11.9
* Network Topology
Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
* Configuration
In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 30 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 300
seconds.
* Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1
(End-Node) (End-Node)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
| | (Judgement #1)
|<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
| | (Packet #1)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #2)
|<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #2)
| |
--- ---
| | ---
|<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request} |
| | (Packet #3) |
| | | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
|------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply} |
| | (Judgement #3) |
| | ---
--- ---
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {SA, Ni})
| | (Judgement #4)
| |
|<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Packet #4)
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA Response (HDR, SK {N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN})
| | (Judgement #5)
| |
|<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL Response (HDR, SK {})
| | (Packet #5)
| |
V V
N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
| Packet #1 |
See Common Packet #2 |
| Packet #2 |
See Common Packet #4 |
| Packet #3 |
See Common Packet #19 |
| Packet #4 |
See below |
| Packet #5 |
See below |
* Packet #4: INFORMATIONAL request
| IPv6 Header |
Source Address |
TN1's Global Address on Link X |
| Destination Address |
NUT's Global Address on Link A |
| UDP Header |
Source Port |
500 |
| Destination Port |
500 |
| IKEv2 Header |
IKE_SA Initiator's SPI |
any |
| IKE_SA Responder's SPI |
any |
| Next Payload |
46 (E) |
| Major Version |
2 |
| Minor Version |
0 |
| Exchange Type |
37 (INFORMATIONAL) |
| X (bits 0-2 of Flags) |
0 |
| I (bit 3 of Flags) |
any |
| V (bit 4 of Flags) |
0 |
| R (bit 5 of Flags) |
0 |
| X (bits 6-7 Flags) |
0 |
| Message ID |
0 |
| Length |
any |
| E Payload |
Next Payload |
42 (D) |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
any |
| Initialization Vector |
The same value as block length of the underlying encryption algorithm |
Encrypted IKE Payloads |
Subsequent payloads encrypted by underlying encryption algorithm |
| Padding |
Any value which to be a multiple of the encryption block size |
| Pad Length |
The length of the Padding field |
| Integrity Checksum Data |
The Cryptographic checksum of the entire message |
| D Payload |
Next Payload |
0 |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
12 |
| Protocol ID |
3 (ESP) |
| SPI Size |
4 |
| # of SPIs |
1 |
| Security Parameter Index |
NUT's inbound CHILD_SA SPI value to be deleted |
* Packet #5: CREATE_CHILD_SA response
| IPv6 Header |
Source Address |
TN1's Global Address on Link X |
| Destination Address |
NUT's Global Address on Link A |
| UDP Header |
Source Port |
500 |
| Destination Port |
500 |
| IKEv2 Header |
IKE_SA Initiator's SPI |
any |
| IKE_SA Responder's SPI |
any |
| Next Payload |
46 (E) |
| Major Version |
2 |
| Minor Version |
0 |
| Exchange Type |
36 (CREATE_CHILD_SA) |
| X (bits 0-2 of Flags) |
0 |
| I (bit 3 of Flags) |
any |
| V (bit 4 of Flags) |
0 |
| R (bit 5 of Flags) |
1 |
| X (bits 6-7 Flags) |
0 |
| Message ID |
0 |
| Length |
any |
| E Payload |
Next Payload |
41 (N) |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
any |
| Initialization Vector |
The same value as block length of the underlying encryption algorithm |
Encrypted IKE Payloads |
Subsequent payloads encrypted by underlying encryption algorithm |
| Padding |
Any value which to be a multiple of the encryption block size |
| Pad Length |
The length of the Padding field |
| Integrity Checksum Data |
The Cryptographic checksum of the entire message |
| D Payload |
Next Payload |
0 |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
8 |
| Protocol ID |
0 |
| SPI Size |
0 |
| # of SPIs |
0 |
| Security Parameter Index |
14 (NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN) |
Part A: (BASIC)
1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
response to the NUT
6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the first negotiated algorithms to NUT.
7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
10. TN1 transmits an INFORMATIONAL request to close an IKE_SA to the NUT.
11. TN1 responds with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response which has a Notify payload of type
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey an IKE_SA.
12. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A
Step 2: Judgment #1
The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2
The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 7: Judgment #3
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
Step 9: Judgment #4
The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey an IKE_SA. The message
includes "ENCR_3DES", "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H
group 2" as proposed algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request has a SA payload
including 1 (IKE) in the Protocol ID field, 8 in the SPI size field and new IKE_SA's SPI
value in the SPI field.
Step 12: Judgment #5
The NUT responds with an INFORMATIONAL response with no payload to an
INFORMATIONAL request to close an IKE_SA.
* Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.