Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.6.3: Simultaneous CHILD_SA Rekeying
Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles simultaneous CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges
to rekey CHILD_SA.
* [RFC 4718] - Sections 5.11.3
* Network Topology
Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
* Configuration
In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 300 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 30
seconds.
* Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1
(End-Node) (End-Node)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
| | (Judgement #1)
|<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
| | (Packet #1)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N+, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #2)
|<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N+, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #2)
| |
--- ---
| | ---
|<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request} |
| | (Packet #3) |
| | | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
|------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply} |
| | (Judgement #3) |
| | ---
--- ---
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #4)
|<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Nr, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #4)
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA Response (HDR, SK {N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #5)
|<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA Response (HDR, SK {N+, SA, Nr, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #5)
| |
|------------------->| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Judgement #6)
| |
|<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Packet #6)
| |
|<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Judgement #7)
| |
|------------------->| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {D})
| | (Packet #7)
| |
|<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request} (new CHILD_SA)
| | (Packet #8)
| |
|------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply} (new CHILD_SA)
| | (Judgement #8)
| |
V V
N: REKEY_SA
N+: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
| Packet #1 |
See Common Packet #2 |
| Packet #2 |
See Common Packet #4 |
| Packet #3 |
See Common Packet #19 |
| Packet #4 |
See Common Packet #13 |
| Packet #5 |
See Common Packet #14 |
| Packet #6 |
See below |
| Packet #7 |
See below |
| Packet #8 |
See Common Packet #19 |
* Packet #6: INFORMATIONAL request
| IPv6 Header |
Source Address |
TN1's Global Address on Link X |
| Destination Address |
NUT's Global Address on Link A |
| UDP Header |
Source Port |
500 |
| Destination Port |
500 |
| IKEv2 Header |
IKE_SA Initiator's SPI |
any |
| IKE_SA Responder's SPI |
any |
| Next Payload |
46 (E) |
| Major Version |
2 |
| Minor Version |
0 |
| Exchange Type |
37 (INFORMATIONAL) |
| X (bits 0-2 of Flags) |
0 |
| I (bit 3 of Flags) |
0 |
| V (bit 4 of Flags) |
0 |
| R (bit 5 of Flags) |
1 |
| X (bits 6-7 Flags) |
0 |
| Message ID |
The same value as corresponding request's Message ID |
| Length |
any |
| E Payload |
Next Payload |
42 (D) |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
any |
| Initialization Vector |
The same value as block length of the underlying encryption algorithm |
Encrypted IKE Payloads |
Subsequent payloads encrypted by underlying encryption algorithm |
| Padding |
Any value which to be a multiple of the encryption block size |
| Pad Length |
The length of the Padding field |
| Integrity Checksum Data |
The Cryptographic checksum of the entire message |
| D Payload |
Next Payload |
0 |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
12 |
| Protocol ID |
3 (ESP) |
| SPI Size |
4 |
| # of SPIs |
1 |
| Security Parameter Index |
NUT's inbound CHILD_SA SPI value of the original CHILD_SA |
* Packet #7: INFORMATIONAL request
| IPv6 Header |
Source Address |
TN1's Global Address on Link X |
| Destination Address |
NUT's Global Address on Link A |
| UDP Header |
Source Port |
500 |
| Destination Port |
500 |
| IKEv2 Header |
IKE_SA Initiator's SPI |
any |
| IKE_SA Responder's SPI |
any |
| Next Payload |
46 (E) |
| Major Version |
2 |
| Minor Version |
0 |
| Exchange Type |
37 (INFORMATIONAL) |
| X (bits 0-2 of Flags) |
0 |
| I (bit 3 of Flags) |
0 |
| V (bit 4 of Flags) |
0 |
| R (bit 5 of Flags) |
1 |
| X (bits 6-7 Flags) |
0 |
| Message ID |
The same value as corresponding request's Message ID |
| Length |
any |
| E Payload |
Next Payload |
42 (D) |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
any |
| Initialization Vector |
The same value as block length of the underlying encryption algorithm |
Encrypted IKE Payloads |
Subsequent payloads encrypted by underlying encryption algorithm |
| Padding |
Any value which to be a multiple of the encryption block size |
| Pad Length |
The length of the Padding field |
| Integrity Checksum Data |
The Cryptographic checksum of the entire message |
| D Payload |
Next Payload |
0 |
| Critical |
0 |
| Reserved |
0 |
| Payload Length |
12 |
| Protocol ID |
3(ESP) |
| SPI Size |
4 |
| # of SPIs |
1 |
| Security Parameter Index |
NUT's inbound CHILD_SA SPI value of the new CHILD_SA initiated by the NUT at Step 9 |
Part A: (BASIC)
1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
response to the NUT
6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the first negotiated algorithms to NUT.
7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
10. TN1 transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey CHILD_SA to the NUT.
11. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
12. TN1 responds with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response to the CRETE_CHILD_SA received
at Step 9. The response message includes minimum Nonce Data.
13. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
14. TN1 responds with an INFORMATIONAL response to the INFORMATIONAL request
received at Step 13.
15. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
16. TN1 responds with an INFORMATIONAL response to the INFORMATIONAL request
received at Step 15.
17. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the existing algorithms to the NUT.
18. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A
Step 2: Judgment #1
The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2
The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 7: Judgment #3
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
Step 9: Judgment #4
The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey a CHILD_SA. The message
includes "ENCR_3DES", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence
Numbers" as proposed algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request includes a Notify
payload of type REKEY_SA containing rekeyed CHILD_SA's SPI value in the SPI field.
Step 11: Judgment #5
The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA response including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 13: Judgment #6
The NUT transmits an INFORMATIONAL request with a Delete Payload including 3 (ESP)
as Protocol ID, 4 as SPI Size and the inblund SPI value of the original CHILD_SA.
Step 15: Judgment #7
The NUT transmits an INFORMATIONAL request with a Delete Payload including 3 (ESP)
as Protocol ID, 4 as SPI Size and the inblund SPI value of the new CHILD_SA initiated by
the NUT at Step 9.
Step 18: Judgment #8
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using the existing CHILD_SA initiated by
the TN1 at Step 10.
* Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.