Title

  Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.6.4: Simultaneous CHILD_SA Rekeying with retransmission
  Part A: (BASIC)


Purpose

  To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles simultaneous CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchanges
  to rekey CHILD_SA.


References

  * [RFC 4718] - Sections 5.11.3


Test Setup

  * Network Topology
      Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
  * Configuration
      In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
      In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 300 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 30
      seconds.
  * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
      IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.


Procedure

   NUT                  TN1
(End-Node)           (End-Node)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
    |                    | (Judgement #1)
    |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
    |                    | (Packet #1)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N+, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #2)
    |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N+, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #2)
    |                    |
   ---                  ---
    |                    |                       ---
    |<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request}   |
    |                    | (Packet #3)            |
    |                    |                        | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
    |------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply}     |
    |                    | (Judgement #3)         |
    |                    |                       ---
   ---                  ---
    |                    |
    |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #4)
    |<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Nr, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #4)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA Response (HDR, SK {N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #5)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
    |                    | (Packet #5)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {D})
    |                    | (Judgement #6)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #7)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA Response (HDR, SK {N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN)})
    |                    | (Packet #6)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request}
    |                    | (Packet #7)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply}
    |                    | (Judgement #8)
    |                    |
    V                    V
N: REKEY_SA N+: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
Packet #1 See Common Packet #2
Packet #2 See Common Packet #4
Packet #3 See Common Packet #19
Packet #4 See Common Packet #13
Packet #5 See below
Packet #6 See below
Packet #7 See Common Packet #19
* Packet #5: INFORMATIONAL request
IPv6 Header Source Address TN1's Global Address on Link X
Destination Address NUT's Global Address on Link A
UDP Header Source Port 500
Destination Port 500
IKEv2 Header IKE_SA Initiator's SPI any
IKE_SA Responder's SPI any
Next Payload 46 (E)
Major Version 2
Minor Version 0
Exchange Type 37 (INFORMATIONAL)
X (bits 0-2 of Flags) 0
I (bit 3 of Flags) 0
V (bit 4 of Flags) 0
R (bit 5 of Flags) 0
X (bits 6-7 Flags) 0
Message ID The same value as corresponding request's Message ID
Length any
E Payload Next Payload 42 (D)
Critical 0
Reserved 0
Payload Length any
Initialization Vector The same value as block length of the underlying encryption algorithm
Encrypted IKE Payloads Subsequent payloads encrypted by underlying encryption algorithm
Padding Any value which to be a multiple of the encryption block size
Pad Length The length of the Padding field
Integrity Checksum Data The Cryptographic checksum of the entire message
D Payload Next Payload 0
Critical 0
Reserved 0
Payload Length 12
Protocol ID 3 (ESP)
SPI Size 4
# of SPIs 1
Security Parameter Index NUT's inbound CHILD_SA SPI value of the original CHILD_SA
Packet #6: CREATE_CHILD_SA response
IPv6 Header Same as Common Packet #14
UDP Header Same as Common Packet #14
IKEv2 Header Same as Common Packet #14
E Payload Same as Common Packet #14
N Payload Next Payload 0
Critical 0
Reserved 0
Payload Length 8
Protocol ID 0
SPI Size 0
Notify Message Type NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN (14)
  Part A: (BASIC)
     1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
     2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
     4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
         response to the NUT
     6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the first negotiated algorithms to NUT.
     7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
     9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     10. TN1 transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey CHILD_SA to the NUT.
     11. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     12. TN1 transmits an INFORMAITONAL request with a Delete Payload to close the replaced
         CHILD_SA.
     13. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     14. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     15. TN1 responds with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response with a Notify payload of type
         NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN to the retransmitted CREATE_CHILD_SA request.
     16. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the existing algorithms to the NUT.
     17. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.


Observable Result

  Part A
       Step 2: Judgment #1
       The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
       algorithms.
       Step 4: Judgment #2
       The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
       Step 7: Judgment #3
       The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
       Step 9: Judgment #4
       The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey a CHILD_SA. The message
       includes "ENCR_3DES", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence
       Numbers" as proposed algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request includes a Notify
       payload of type REKEY_SA containing rekeyed CHILD_SA's SPI value in the SPI field.
       Step 11: Judgment #5
       The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA response including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
       Step 13: Judgment #6
       The NUT transmits an INFORMATIONAL response with a Delete Payload including 3
       (ESP) as Protocol ID, 4 as SPI Size and the inblund SPI value of the original CHILD_SA.
       Step 14: Judgment #7
       The NUT retransmits the same CREATE_CHILD_SA request as the message at Step 11. The
       message includes "ENCR_3DES", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence
       Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
       Step 17: Judgment #8
       The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using the existing CHILD_SA initiated by
       the TN1 at Step 10.


Possible Problems

  * Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.