Title

  Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.6.5: Simultaneous IKE_SA Rekeying
  Part A: (BASIC)

Purpose

  To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles a CREATE_CHILD_SA to rekey IKE_SA.

References

  * [RFC 4718] - Sections 5.11.4

Test Setup

  * Network Topology
      Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
  * Configuration
      In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
      In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 60 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 300
      seconds.
  * Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
      IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.

Procedure

   NUT                  TN1
(End-Node)           (End-Node)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
    |                    | (Judgement #1)
    |<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
    |                    | (Packet #1)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Judgement #2)
    |<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
    |                    | (Packet #2)
    |                    |
   ---                  ---
    |                    |                       ---
    |<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request}   |
    |                    | (Packet #3)            |
    |                    |                        | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
    |------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply}     |
    |                    | (Judgement #3)         |
    |                    |                       ---
   ---                  ---
    |                    |
    |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {SA, Ni})
    |                    | (Judgement #4)
    |<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {SA, Ni})
    |                    | (Packet #4)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA Response (HDR, SK {SA, Nr})
    |                    | (Judgement #5)
    |<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA Response (HDR, SK {SA, Nr})
    |                    | (Packet #5)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
    |                    | (Judgement #6)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {})
    |                    | (Packet #6)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {D})
    |                    | (Judgement #7)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {})
    |                    | (Packet #7)
    |                    |
    |<-------------------| INFORMATIONAL request (HDR, SK {})
    |                    | (Packet #8)
    |                    |
    |------------------->| INFORMATIONAL response (HDR, SK {})
    |                    | (Judgement #8)
    |                    |
    V                    V
 N: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE

Packet #1	See Common Packet #2
Packet #2	See Common Packet #4
Packet #3	See Common Packet #19
Packet #4	See Common Packet #11
Packet #5	See Common Packet #12
Packet #6	See Common Packet #18
Packet #7	See Common Packet #18
Packet #8	See Common Packet #17

  Part A: (BASIC)
     1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
     2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
     4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
         response to the NUT
     6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms to NUT.
     7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
     9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     10. TN1 transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey IKE_SA to the NUT.
     11. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     12. TN1 responds with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response to the CREATE_CHILD_SA request
         received at Step 9. The response message includes minimum Nonce Data to make the NUT
         send a message to close duplicated IKE_SA.
     13. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     14. TN1 responds with an INFORMATIONAL response with no payload.
     15. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
     16. TN1 responds with an INFORMATIONAL response with no payload.
     17. TN1 transmits an INFORMATIONAL request with no payload to the NUT. The message is
         cryptographically protected by the new IKE_SA initiated by TN1 at Step 10.
     18. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.

Observable Result

  Part A
       Step 2: Judgment #1
       The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
       algorithms.

       Step 4: Judgment #2
       The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.

       Step 7: Judgment #3
       The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.

       Step 9: Judgment #4
       The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey an IKE_SA. The message
       includes "ENCR_3DES", "PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H
       group 2" as proposed algorithms. And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request has a SA payload
       including 1 (IKE) in the Protocol ID field, 8 in the SPI size field and new IKE_SA's SPI
       value in the SPI field.

       Step 11: Judgment #5
       The NUT responds a CREATE_CHILD_SA response including "ENCR_3DES",
       "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
       And the proposal in the SA payload Response has a SA payload including 1 (IKE) in the

Possible Problems

  * Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.