Test IKEv2.EN.I.1.2.6.9: Rekeying a New CHILD_SA
Part A: (BASIC)
To verify an IKEv2 device properly handles a request to rekey nonexistent CHILD_SA.
* [RFC 4718] - Sections 5.11.7
* Network Topology
Connect the devices according to the Common Topology.
* Configuration
In each part, configure the devices according to the Common Configuration.
In addition, set IKE_SA Lifetime to 300 seconds and set CHILD_SA Lifetime to 30
seconds.
* Pre-Sequence and Cleanup Sequence
IKEv2 on the NUT is disabled after each part.
NUT TN1
(End-Node) (End-Node)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_SA_INIT request (HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni)
| | (Judgement #1)
|<-------------------| IKE_SA_INIT Response (HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr)
| | (Packet #1)
| |
|------------------->| IKE_AUTH request (HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH, N+, SAi2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #2)
|<-------------------| IKE_AUTH Response (HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH, N+, SAr2, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #2)
| |
--- ---
| | ---
|<-------------------| IPsec {Echo Request} |
| | (Packet #3) |
| | | repeat Echo exchange until lifetime of SA is expired
|------------------->| IPsec {Echo Reply} |
| | (Judgement #3) |
| | ---
--- ---
| |
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #4)
| X----------| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SK {N+, SA, Nr, TSi, TSr})
| | (Packet #4)
| |
|<-------------------| CREATE_CHILD_SA request (HDR, SK {N, N+, SA, Ni, TSi, TSr})
| | (Judgement #5)
|------------------->| CREATE_CHILD_SA response (HDR, SK {N(NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN)})
| | (Packet #5)
| |
V V
N: REKEY_SA
N+: USE_TRANSPORT_MODE
| Packet #1 |
See Common Packet #2 |
| Packet #2 |
See Common Packet #4 |
| Packet #3 |
See Common Packet #19 |
| Packet #4 |
See Common Packet #14 |
| Packet #5 |
See Common Packet #14
The SPI value in the Delete payload is the same
value as the SPI value in Packet #4 SA payload. |
Part A: (BASIC)
1. NUT starts to negotiate with TN1 by sending IKE_SA_INIT request.
2. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
3. TN1 responds with an IKE_SA_INIT response to the NUT.
4. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
5. After reception of IKE_AUTH request from the NUT, TN1 responds with an IKE_AUTH
response to the NUT
6. TN1 transmits an Echo Request with IPsec ESP using the first negotiated algorithms to NUT.
7. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
8. Repeat Steps 6 and 7 until lifetime of SA is expired.
9. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
10. TN1 transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA response to rekey a CHILD_SA to the NUT. But the
response does not reach the NUT.
11. TN1 transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request to rekey the CHILD_SA which were
supposed to be created by rekey.
12. Observe the messages transmitted on Link A.
Part A
Step 2: Judgment #1
The NUT transmits an IKE_SA_INIT request including "ENCR_3DES",
"PRF_HMAC_SHA1", "AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "D-H group 2" as proposed
algorithms.
Step 4: Judgment #2
The NUT transmits an IKE_AUTH request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
Step 7: Judgment #3
The NUT transmits an Echo Reply with IPsec ESP using corresponding algorithms.
Step 9: Judgment #4
The NUT transmits a CREATE_CHILD_SA request including "ENCR_3DES",
"AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96" and "No Extended Sequence Numbers" as proposed algorithms.
And the CREATE_CHILD_SA request includes a Notify payload of type REKEY_SA
containing rekeyed CHILD_SA's SPI value in the SPI field.
Step 12: Judgment #5
The NUT responds with a CREATE_CHILD_SA response with a Notify of type
NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN.
* Each NUT has the different lifetime of SA.